

ATTACHED: PLEASE TRY NOT TO
REMOVE FROM DOCUMENTS THANKS...

ER 85-5704
AC, S-1007/85

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

✓
25 MAR 1986

[] response to your query on use
of intelligence data with the Soviets during
arms talks.

Ben

Date 7 January 86

STAT

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ACIS - 1007/85
6 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence ←
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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SUBJECT: Use of Intelligence Data (U)

REFERENCE: Memo for C/ACIS, et al, fm DCI, dtd 20 Dec 85

1. This "fast-track" memorandum is for your information, unless you care to issue instructions after reading it. (U)

2. A few days ago you sent to NIO/SP and to me a short memorandum (see reference; copy attached) about the use of intelligence data in the arms control negotiations with the USSR. Your question addressed the issue of force structure data derived from US intelligence. The question you raised basically is: does the US still provide information about the force structures of both the US and the USSR in arms control negotiations; e.g., START? You also raised the issue of MBFR. (S/NF)

3. Our answer is comprehensive; it addresses all of the arms control negotiations, not just the Nuclear and Space arms talks in Geneva. In overview, the US uses information on occasion about Soviet forces in the negotiations (for example, to rebut Soviet statements), but that data is not classified intelligence; rather, it is from earlier Soviet statements or US publications containing declassified intelligence. (S/NF)

4. In this Administration, the US has taken the position that it is up to the USSR to put data on its forces into the negotiations as the basis for the talks--whatever they are. This approach was in place when I came to ACIS in mid-1982. Almost without exception since early 1981, US arms control delegations have been under instruction not to reveal US intelligence data to the Soviet negotiators. With only few rare exceptions, US delegations fulfill these instructions because the delegations take these instructions quite seriously. (S/NF)

NST:

5. It is true that most of the Soviet force data during the SALT I and II negotiations was furnished by the US, but the situation was alleviated

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considerably by the data exchange which was a part of the SALT II Agreement. In fact, the SALT II Agreement contained information on Soviet forces, such as the number of warheads on their MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. (S/NF)

6. When the START talks began in 1982, the Soviets consistently used the data found in the SALT II Treaty to describe their forces. Since then, basic modifications of Soviet forces have been reported in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)--as required in the 1972 ABM Treaty and in the Interim Agreement for strategic offensive forces, for all the forces covered in those two accords, and as a gesture of goodwill for SALT II forces. The Soviets have also furnished information through diplomatic channels and in public announcements. For example, in the SCC, they have reported the dismantlement of submarines (SSBNs), the deployment of the SS-25, and the destruction of SS-11 silos. In diplomatic channels, they have informed us of the start of testing of the SS-X-24. In public announcements, they have claimed the deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. (S/NF)

7. In the NST talks themselves, the Soviets have provided us on occasion with such information as the Soviet designator for the BLACKJACK bomber (TU-160), the fact that they had an ASAT system, and, informally, the number of RVs on the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23. (S/NF)


8. In addition, the Soviet task has been made somewhat easier by the publication in the US of "Soviet Military Power", various posture statements by US officials, and the publications of such institutions as the IISS in London. (S/NF)

9. Naturally, the Soviets have used all of these sources to rebut US contentions and to reinforce their own negotiating positions. (By the way, the US does not always agree with Soviet statements; on occasion, the US says so.) (S/NF)

MBFR/CDE :

10. The US has not discussed its data on Soviet conventional forces in the MBFR negotiations for several years. This has been due primarily to refusal on the part of the Soviets to enter into a meaningful dialogue on forces' data. No discussions of data on Soviet forces have taken place in the CDE talks, although declassified data have been provided to the Ambassador for his use in rebutting Soviet statements. (S/NF)

11. If there is anything further we can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. (U)



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Executive Registry	
85-	5004

20 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Force Structure Information

I understand that from 1968 to date in strategic arms talks the United States has provided the information about the force structure for both sides. Is this still the case? If it is, it seems to me that it has us giving our intelligence and permitting the Soviets to know where we are good and where we are bad. Wouldn't it be proper and better for us to provide information about our force structure and ask the Soviets to do the same with respect to theirs? What is the rationale for doing it otherwise? I believe the same question pertains with respect to the MBFR negotiations.



William J. Casey

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1 DCI		X		
	2 DDCI		X		
	3 EXDIR				
	4 D/ICS				
	5 DDI	X			
	6 DDA				
	7 DDO				
	8 DDS&T				
	9 Chm/NIC				
	10 GC				
	11 IG				
	12 Compt				
	13 D/OLL				
	14 D/PAO				
	15 D/PERS				
	16 VC/NIC				
	17 NIO/SP		X		
	18 C/ACIS/DI		X		
	19 D/SOVA		X		
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		SUSPENSE _____ Date			

Remarks

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Executive Secretary
20 Dec 85

Date

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Executive Registry

85- 5004

20 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Force Structure Information

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